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It being impracticable to express in these columns the divergent views of the thousands of members of the American Peace Society, full responsibility for the utterances of this magazine is assumed by the Editor.

THIS SOCIETY

EVERY FRIEND of the American Peace Society will wish to be reminded that the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has repeated its offer to give to the American Peace Society a sum equal to its income from other sources up to and including \$15,000. This simply means that every dollar contributed to the service of the American Peace Society, up to \$15,000, will be duplicated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Presented with this situation during our last fiscal year, friends met the situation and oversubscribed the amount before the expiration of the time.

We have no doubt they will wish to do the same now. *The time is limited.*

UNDER DATE of October 8, the American Peace Society wrote to the Secretary of State as follows:

The Honorable THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: The American Peace Society gladly places its library, archives, magazines, and officers at the service of the coming Conference on the Limitation of Armament.

Please feel at liberty to indicate any direction our efforts may take to the promotion of the high matters upon which the conference is about to enter.

THE CONFERENCE

THE CONFERENCE on the Limitation of Armament, called in time of peace for the firmer establishment of peace, has aroused a great hope. Peoples everywhere are expecting results—tangible results. The results to be sought for first, it appears, are four in number, namely: First, the limitation of naval armament; second, an agreement upon rules for the control of new agencies of warfare; third, the limitation of land armament; fourth, an agreement relative to questions affecting the Pacific and the Far East. We have no doubt that agreements will be reached in all four of these fields. We have no doubt that these agreements will ameliorate the ills of the world and lessen the chances of war. Even if they were disposed to ignore the aspirations of men everywhere, which is unthinkable, the conferees in Washington would not dare to adjourn without tangible results in these regards. There is something in the very air which says to everybody, these conferees included, that in these matters the peoples of the world are deadily in earnest.

While, therefore, we expect results in these very definite directions, we dare to believe that there will be results of a still more significant and hopeful character. We do not agree with Mr. Henry Ford, that the invited company "are determined to dictate the program." Neither do we agree with him that the conference "is in grave danger of being twisted and turned until it becomes unrecognizable." Furthermore, we do not agree with him that it is indispensable that the American host must "*insist* (the italics are ours) on the American program going through." We are not disturbed over the boggy of the "war debts." We do not believe that the American delegates are called upon "to be hard, unflinching." We do not believe that just now there is any "fundamental difference between the American and the European idea." Our faith is that the Washington conference is as different from the Paris Peace Conference as white is from black. The swords of the nations represented in Washington are not dripping with the blood of war; they are not even unsheathed. The war psychology has melted under the bright light of Armistice Day. Good will! We have it everywhere in Washington. It is indeed, as said by Kant, "the only jewel that shines by its own light," and it is here. It will occupy the central place there, in the conferences that are to come.

Out of such conferences, called at such a time as this, and in this spirit, no one can forecast the immeasurable benefits which we may reasonably expect to follow. We are convinced that the conferees are quite well aware that the abiding results will be found in the new international policies which they will recognize and promote. An extended international co-operation is on the way. The United States will gladly join, for the international policies of the day that is to be will spring inevitably from those experiences consonant with American political science and recognized by all as acceptable and practicable. It is for this reason that the American Peace Society has sent to all officially connected with the conferences the pamphlet and letter self-explanatory copies of which appear elsewhere in these columns. Every friend of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament will be interested to recall and review the principles therein set forth, not only because they are acceptable to America, but because they are consonant with the international achievements throughout a worthy past. We have no doubt that the principles therein set forth are germane to the meditations of this and of the succeeding conferences sure to follow. They will yet be incorporated more firmly into the practice of nations, for they relate very fundamentally to the international policies of the approaching tomorrows. They are certainly very pertinent to those high matters relating to the promotion of a peace of justice between nations.

LIMITING ARMAMENTS

(WRITING NOVEMBER 11.)

TO THE man on the street it seems difficult to understand why it is necessary to have so many experts at the Washington conference. He inquires, if the object of the conference is to limit armaments, why not limit them and adjourn?

Of course, the job is not so simple as that. One Power will say that for every naval item given up there must be an equivalent given up by the other naval Powers. Some of the big Powers will insist that the present ratio of naval strength shall be maintained, in order that they may not be placed in positions weaker than the ones they now occupy. We understand that the British have accepted, it is not necessary to know with what grace, the principle of equality of naval strength with the United States. Naturally, it will be argued, steps must be taken to see that the difference in strength of the two navies shall at least not be increased. We are told that the American delegation has agreed upon certain definitions. For example, the phrase "limitation of armament" is held to mean that all the nations shall be permitted to finish the building

programs already authorized. By "reduction of armament" is meant that vessels still in commission shall be scrapped when obsolete, and that they shall not be replaced; indeed, that the expense of keeping up these old vessels shall be eliminated.

It will probably be found necessary to define what is meant by "replacement" with respect to vessels now in first-class condition, but which in time will become inferior in value to new types. It is necessary to decide what is meant by "naval strength." It would seem reasonable to include merchant marine and all auxiliary vessels capable of being converted into war ships, as well as all bases, fortified or unfortified, if capable of use in naval operations.

Naturally, there will be many differences of opinion about all these matters. Decisions with reference to them will have to be made in accordance with the facts. Take the matter of the millions of dollars spent annually to maintain naval bases and repair stations at remote points. Naturally, this relates to a possible naval conflict in the Pacific, where the bases of operations are quite as important as the vessels themselves. Such matters, and there are many others, present a maze of scientific and quasi-scientific, political, and economic problems incapable, in our judgment, of solution, but which will have to be carefully studied before there can be any hope of agreement.

We are told that the navy is presenting alternative plans—one predicated on a diplomatic settlement of various disputes in the Far East; another, perfect agreement with reference to fortifications. We have no doubt that there are others. In our judgment, one of the most difficult of all the problems is to overcome a certain prejudice, the *amour propre*, of the various military branches of the governments. The different branches of the naval service will find it difficult to agree among themselves as to which class of death-dealing instrument can most safely be reduced. The point, however, here is that the conference bids fair to open amid a *mélange* of divergent views and interests. Thus far, no one has risen to suggest a sure and acceptable way out of the maze.

Yet there would seem to be a simple way out of the difficulty. Why can't the nations agree to limit their expenditures for war to a certain percentage of their income? We don't know what percentage the nations could be brought to accept; but the principle seems both simple and reasonable. The United States is spending 93 per cent of its income because of war. This percentage does not vary materially in England, France, Italy, Japan. Manifestly, the percentage is too high. Why not agree, as a start, to cut the expense pay to 70 per cent? There would be every advantage in such a plan. This is particularly true if the nations are inter-